of PBF on non-clinical dimensions of satisfaction also suggests that PBF incentivizes providers to raise 12 patients' satisfaction with non-clinical services if it is associated with future financial gains. It is 13 recommended that low and middle income countries build on the experience from high income 14 countries to better listen to patients' voice in general and include an assessment of patients' satisfaction 15 in incentive mechanisms as a way to increase the benefits of the strategy. 16
Introduction

20
Over recent decades, paying healthcare providers against agreed performance targets has gained 21 momentum in high income countries and more recently in low and middle income countries (LMIC). 22
Financial incentives aim to provide extrinsic motivation so as to improve health workforce performance 23 and contribute to a health system's performance. Poor performance in health systems is a worldwide 24 concern and greater investment in the health sector do not necessarily translate to better health 25 outcomes (World Health Organization, 2000) . 26
Performance incentives are increasingly promoted to enhance health workforce performance. While 27 many terms are being used for performance systems (performance-based incentives, performance-28 based contracting, results-based financing, Pay-4-Performance) the term Performance-Based Financing 29 (PBF) is adopted in this paper as it is commonly used in LMIC countries. PBF can be defined as "a system 30 approach with an orientation on results defined as quantity and quality of service outputs and inclusion 31 of vulnerable persons (…)" (Cordaid-SINA Health, 2014) . 32 PBF is increasingly adopted in LMIC although the reform approach has been criticized on several fronts. 33 Ireland et al. (2011) highlight the lack of rigorous evidence apart from Rwanda and a bias in publishing 34 only positive results on PBF. They claim that the strategy has important administrative costs and that it 35 can deter equity in access to services. They also argue that PBF may crowd out intrinsic motivation and 36 encourage gaming within the system. Nevertheless the consensus on the positive effect of the strategy 37 is growing as new evidence becomes available. For instance in Burundi, PBF was found to improve the 38 utilization and quality of most maternal and child health services (Bonfrer, Van de Poel, & Van 39 Doorslaer, 2014). The potential of performance-based financing to address structural problems of health 40 systems is more and more acknowledged. As argued by Meessen, Soucat, and Sekabaraga (2011), PBF 41 can be a reform catalyst. PBF is now recognized as a holistic reform approach comparable to the old 42
As opposed to demand side interventions that incentivize the population to use health care services 48 (such as conditional cash transfers or vouchers), this article focuses on a supply side mechanism that 49 incentivizes healthcare providers' to achieve quantitative and qualitative targets in the delivery of 50 services. Such mechanisms usually rely on indicators related to providers' practice with the quality of 51 care traditionally being measured from a clinical viewpoint. Patients' view on their interaction with the 52 health system has often been overlooked in the past. Patients' satisfaction is however a desired 53 outcome of care and an indicator of process quality (Donabedian, 1988) . 54
Satisfaction with health services is a multidimensional phenomenon and is categorized in various ways in 55 the literature. Patients' satisfaction results from their perception of service quality including: 56 interpersonal quality, which reflects the relationship between the service provider and the patient; 57 technical quality, which relates to the outcomes achieved and the technical competence of the service 58 provider; environment quality, which corresponds to environmental features that shape consumer 59 service perceptions; and administrative quality, which relates to facilitating (non-health related) services 60 for the delivery and consumption of the health service (Dagger, Sweeney, & Johnson, 2007) . The 61 evidence suggests that patients' satisfaction is predominantly determined by the quality of medical care 62 (including competences, infrastructure, health services, diagnostic and therapeutic procedures); 63 information; equity in access; costs; waiting time; cleanliness; and participative approach of care 64 (Mpinga & Chastonay, 2011) . 65
The patient-oriented perspective of this paper is justified on three grounds. First, one cannot ignore the 66 impact a strategy has on users' satisfaction as it stands for a critical component of service quality 67 evaluation. Second, patients' satisfaction affects compliance with treatment and is therefore important 68 from a public health perspective. Third, satisfied patients will continue using services and recommend 69 services to others. As PBF in LMIC primarily aims to increase utilization of health services, it is critical to 70 ascertain that poor satisfaction with services is not hampering overall utilization. PBF focuses on 71 providers and sets clinical targets: thus, the hypothesis is that PBF will result in improved satisfaction 72 from clinical aspects but will have no effect on satisfaction with non-clinical dimensions. This hypothesis 73 is tested with data from a randomized control trial of the national PBF scheme in Rwanda. In this 74 scheme targeting primary healthcare facilities, incentives were based on the quantity of outputs 75 achieved conditional on the quality of services delivered using 14 maternal and child health output 76 indicators and 13 quality indicators (Basinga et al., 2011) . Patients' satisfaction was not measured. 77 This paper will also aim to verify the reform potential of PBF with a particular focus on patients' 78 satisfaction in quality assurance. The analysis covers satisfaction with prenatal care and with curative 79 care for children and adults. In the subsequent sections, a brief literature review on patients' 80 satisfaction and PBF is presented, followed by methods, results and a discussion with policy 81 recommendations. 82
Background
83
Performance incentives across the world were designed to address agency issues resulting from the 84 agent (provider) having different goals and motivations than those of the principal (patient or purchaser 85 of health services). Performance incentives aim to align the objectives of the agent with those of the 86 principal by tying the reward to the achievement of the principals' objectives. The downside, if PBF does 87 not include a complete set of outputs to ensure the full health package is delivered, is that providers 88 may focus on rewarded services and overlook other parts of their activity. One direct implication is that 89 providers will have no incentive to raise patients' satisfaction if they are not rewarded for it. However, 90 as unsatisfied patients' may decide not to visit the facility again, providers may perceive the need to 91 satisfy patients, even in the absence of a reward, in particular for dimensions that determine the most 92 satisfaction and that they can influence. 93
In HIC, patients' satisfaction surveys are regularly used to collect their judgment on the quality of care In most P4P schemes in HIC, a measure of patients' satisfaction is used, along with process (content of 102 care), outcome (effect of care on patients) and structure measures (facility, personnel, equipment) to 103 calculate the financial incentive (Peterson et al., 2006 
Methods
124
Study design
125
The empirical study relies on data from the impact evaluation of the national PBF for primary level 126 facilities in Rwanda. It was the first randomized experiment used to rigorously assess the impact of PBF 127 randomly assigned to treatment (12 districts) or control groups (7 districts). The remaining 11 districts 130 that already piloted PBF were excluded from the impact evaluation. The three urban districts of the 131 country were not included; therefore the study focuses on rural districts only. 132
Data
133
The study relies on secondary data analysis. The first factor structure derived from polychoric correlation resulted in only one factor having an 157
Eigenvalue over 1 and explaining 88% of the variation. However, waiting time, time with provider and 158 cleanliness were not well captured by the first factor as their uniqueness exceeded their contribution to 159 factor 1 (Table 3-1 and Table 3 -2). These variables were thus removed from factor 1 and factor 1 was 160 normalized to facilitate interpretation. As further analysis showed that they could not be combined in an 161 index, they were kept as single measures of satisfaction. 162 
Statistical methods
167
Ordinary least squares (OLS) were used for the regression on the clinical satisfaction index for each 168 sample. OLS were compared to a censored model (Tobit) assuming no negative values. Regression 169 outcomes from OLS and Tobit were comparable revealing the robustness of OLS outputs presented in 170 this paper. Independent variables aimed to control for facility characteristics (public or faith-based, PBF 171 treatment or control); individual characteristics (primary education, sex when relevant, age, health 172 insurance); and characteristics of the health service (whether the patient was given a prescription to buy 173 drugs outside or to perform laboratory tests from another health facility). In the sample of pregnant 174 women, controls also included the months of pregnancy and whether it was their first prenatal care 175
visit. In the sample of children, their age was controlled for. For all models, all independent variables 176 were included in the models based on variables' availability and variables that proved to influence 177 satisfaction in the literature. A review of the literature indeed revealed that sicker patients tend to be 178 less satisfied, while older and less educated patients are more satisfied. Evidence on gender, ethnicity 179 and socio-economic status remains unclear (Crow et 
Results
196
Descriptive analysis
197
The majority of respondents were satisfied with prenatal care and curative care for children and adults. 198
Overall satisfaction (respondent satisfied or very satisfied) with service reached 86% for adult curative 199 care, 90% for child curative care and 95% for prenatal care. Satisfaction with the cost of drugs and 200 services, which occurs in about 90% of cases, is probably due to the fact that most patients benefit from 201 health insurance. Drugs delivered at the facility and medical services are thus free of charge, except for a 202 small financial contribution. Dissatisfaction with waiting time is the largest of the three categories of 203 care as close to half of respondents were not satisfied (Figure 1 to Figure 3) . On average, patients 204 waited for two and half hours before seeing a healthcare provider and 20% to 25% had to wait for more 205 than three hours (and some up to eight hours). Descriptive statistics of independent variables included 206 in the models are presented in Annex 1. T-tests reveal overall balance between the treatment and 207 control groups. 208 
221
Marginal effects computed in Table 4 -2 show that men were 7% more likely to be unsatisfied or very 222 unsatisfied with waiting time compared to women. A possible explanation could be that the opportunity 223 cost of waiting is higher for men. Adults were also 7% less likely to be satisfied with an additional waiting 224 hour and 3% less likely to be very satisfied. Age is positively associated with satisfaction with waiting 225 time as older patients tend to be more satisfied. PBF has no effect on satisfaction with waiting time but 226 a positive effect on satisfaction with time spent with provider as patients were 2% more likely to be very 227 satisfied in treatment facilities. Patients in PBF facilities were also 4% more likely to be very satisfied 228 with cleanliness. Contrary to waiting time, patients' characteristics did not influence satisfaction with 229 time spent with the provider and the cleanliness of the facility (Table 4 -2). 230 
232
Prenatal care 233
Results on satisfaction with prenatal care present some differences when compared to satisfaction 234 levels with curative care for adults. As for adults, pregnant women seeking care from PBF facilities were 235 more likely to be satisfied with clinical services (+1%). However, PBF also positively influenced 236 satisfaction with waiting time which was not the case for adults. Finally, PBF showed no effect on 237 satisfaction with time spent with provider and cleanliness. Satisfaction with clinical services decreased in 238 public facilities but increased when women were asked to perform laboratory tests from another facility 239 (+1%). Satisfaction with care also slightly rose with months of pregnancy (Table 4-3) . 240 
243
Marginal effects associated with the three non-clinical dimensions of satisfaction showed that women 244 were 3% more likely to be satisfied and 4% more likely to be very satisfied with waiting time in PBF 245 facilities compared to the control group. Satisfaction with waiting time decreased by 4% among more 246 educated women and with time spent waiting (-6% per hour) but this improved with months of 247 pregnancy. Satisfaction with time spent with providers decreases with primary education (Table 4- 
4). 248
Satisfaction with waiting time, time with provider and cleanliness of the facility was consistently greater 249 in faith-based facilities compared to public facilities, with the probability of women being very satisfied 250 increasing from 3% to 6% in faith-based facilities (Table 4-4). As for adults, most individual 251 characteristics did not influence satisfaction with time spent with provider and cleanliness of the facility. 252 
264
As for other groups of patients, waiting time was the satisfaction dimension most influenced by 265 individual characteristics. Insured respondents and those with primary education were less likely to be 266 satisfied or very satisfied with waiting time. Their satisfaction also decreased as they spent more time 267 waiting. Satisfaction with time spent with the provider was higher for younger children. Finally, patients 268 were 4.5% more likely to be very satisfied with cleanliness in faith-based facilities (Table 4-6) . 269 
Robustness check
273
Robustness checks were run to see whether satisfaction with clinical services (index) was influenced by 274 regional disparities in the utilization of health services. Utilization of four or more prenatal care visits 275 and of curative care for children in the event of an illness was aggregated at the district level to create 276 two groups of districts (lower and upper) according to their utilization level. This grouping revealed that 277 the overall coverage of four or more antenatal care visits was larger than that of curative care for 278 children in the event of an illness. Higher utilization of services was observed in almost the same districts 279 for both services (Southern and Northern part of the country) and Eastern districts consistently 280 registered with lower utilization rates (Figure 4 and Figure 5) . 281 
282
The robustness checks confirm the positive effect of PBF on patients' satisfaction with clinical services 283 among pregnant women and children under five. They reveal however that PBF has an effect on 284 satisfaction of pregnant women only in districts where utilization of prenatal care is the lowest (+0.5%) 285
and an effect on satisfaction with child curative care in places where utilization is the highest (+3%) 286 (Table 4-7) . 287 
Limitations
290
This paper has its own limitations, although it is one of the first papers to explore the effect of 291 performance incentives on patients' satisfaction in MLIC. As the instructions given to the survey firm on 292 the number of patients to interview in each facility were misunderstood in 2006, too few interviews 293 were conducted on satisfaction at baseline. Thus, only 2008 (follow-up) data is used in the analysis 294 which does not allow isolating the impact of PBF through difference-in-difference technique. Only causal 295 relationships can be drawn. Nevertheless, the analysis benefits from the randomized design of the study 296 and rigorous evaluation of households' perception of the quality of care in their health facility, 297 measured from the household surveys, showed balance at baseline between treatment and control 298 groups (Basinga, 2009) . One can reasonably assume that satisfaction of patients exiting the same 299 facilities was also comparable at baseline and that any difference observed at follow-up can be 300 attributed to PBF. 301 302
Discussion
303
This paper adds to knowledge in at least three ways: first, it provides evidence on patients' satisfaction 304 with health services in rural Rwanda. Second, it provides evidence on determinants of patient 305 satisfaction and discusses differences between HIC and LMIC that can serve as policy recommendations. 306
Third, it confirms the PBF reform potential related to quality assurance and patients satisfaction. satisfaction with clinical services improved by 2.5% for adult care, 1% for prenatal care and 2% for child 318 care in PBF facilities suggesting that productivity gains achieved through PBF did not hamper healthcare 319 service quality as perceived by patients. This is a key finding as service quality under pay-for-320 performance schemes is a major concern in the literature (Greene & Nash, 2009; Peterson et al., 2006) . 321 Second, PBF can influence non-clinical dimensions of satisfaction if health care providers find an 322 incentive to do so, that is to say if the dimension is somehow compatible with the existing incentives. 323
For instance, with PBF, the proportion of very satisfied adults increases by 2% for time spent with 324 provider and by 4% for cleanliness of the facility whereas those dimensions are not influenced by PBF 325 for pregnant women and children. This may reveal that contrary to pregnant women who primarily pay 326 attention to clinical services as they have no alternative but to visit the health facility, adults that are not 327 satisfied with non-clinical services could have chosen self-medication and thus not visited the facility. As 328 a consequence, health care providers have an incentive to satisfy adults with clinical but also non-clinical 329 dimensions so that they visit the facility again and advise other people to do so, which will have a 330 positive effect of providers' earnings. Interestingly, PBF has no effect on waiting time except for 331 pregnant women: pregnant women are 7% more likely to be satisfied or very satisfied with waiting time 332 in PBF facilities. This suggests that healthcare providers have adopted a coping strategy to raise 333 satisfaction among patients that represent the largest potential financial gain. If pregnant women are 334 very pleased, they may visit the facility again for prenatal care (rewarded service) and institutional 335 delivery (the service with the largest financial reward). This contradicts evidence from the Democratic 336
Republic of Congo where PBF had a negative (but not significant) effect on waiting time (Soeters et al., 337 2011 ). In the case of adults and children, dissatisfaction with waiting time can reflect the lack of human 338 resources, space and equipment, but also poor responsiveness of healthcare providers which do not 339 have an incentive to reduce waiting times. 340
Satisfaction with clinical services is greater among insured patients (+7% for adults and +5% for 341 children). Prescribing laboratory tests also influences a pregnant woman's satisfaction as she may feel 342 that the provider is taking good care of her. Interestingly, individual characteristics do not influence 343 patients' satisfaction with clinical services but only satisfaction with non-clinical services. The study finds 344 that women, older patients and less educated patients tend to be more satisfied with non-clinical 345 services in Rwanda, which is in accordance with published evidence on the determinants of patients' 346 satisfaction (Crow et This paper supports the hypothesis that PBF succeeds in improving patients' satisfaction levels with 387 health services, in particular for clinical related services. Improvements in staff availability , productivity 388 and competences can result in patients being more satisfied with both clinical and non-clinical services 389 provided. In other words, efficiency gains are not achieved at the expense of a perceived quality of care. 390
In some instances, PBF can also improve satisfaction with non-clinical dimensions if they can generate 391 future financial gains. 392
The positive effect of PBF on patient satisfaction confirms that PBF is more than a provider payment 393 mechanism because it can contribute in strengthening health systems. As satisfaction with services can 394 improve healthcare utilization and health outcomes, LMIC should build on the experience of high 395 income countries' to respond better to the voice of patients' and include their feedback in quality 396 assessments. As PBF is increasingly implemented in African countries, its reform catalyst potential 397 should further be explored. 398 
399
Annex 1 400
